MODULE OUTLINE
A range of issues will be discussed. Are top managers paid unreasonable amounts Do they take excessive risks with corporate assets should they take any risks at all Can the financial and ownership structure of a company be used to limit or influence the incentives that top managers have to protect themselves at the expense of other groups such as employees,shareholders and bondholders such as banks How can we reliably assess the performance of the CEO if the information we need to do the assessment, is known only to the CEO Can we design the explicit contracts of employees managers shareholders and bondholders to reduce such tensions Can implicit contracts achieve similar effects Do mergers create any real improvements or are they merely manifestations of empire-building by top managers How agency costs and asymmetric information are linked How does it hurt shareholders What is the role of the Corporate Board These are examples of the type of questions raised by the module and, though there can be no definite answers to these questions the perspectives that have proven useful in seeking solutions are discussed. The standard topics such as valuation, capital structure and dividend policy will be discussed. Special topics such as corporate governance, mergers and executive compensation will be introduced. The unifying theme of the module role of contracts, be they explicit or implicit, in organizing the financial activities of corporations in the conext of agency costs and asymmetric information.
MODULE AIM
The aim of this module is two-fold. First, to provide a reasonably thorough introduction to a range of the many critical financial decisions facing a corporation. Second, and more specifically, to examine the effect, of the concepts of agency and information asymmetry, on these decisions. The purpose of the module is to create the awareness that, an appreciation of the role of these two concepts, is useful and often essential, if you need to participate in the making of various decisions of a company and in particular of financial decisions.
MODULE OUTCOMES
The outcomes of the module are: First, you will be able to describe and identify a number of instances of financial decision making where the incentive of managers is to increase their own welfare at the expense of other stakeholders in a corporation. Second, you will be able to discuss how financial and ownership structure can mitigate and control such incentives. Third, you will be able describe the concept of information asymmetry in relation to financial decisions. Fourth, you will be able to describe the different transactions in the market for corporate control and discuss the role of corporate financial choices in this context. Fifth, you will be able to critically comment on the role of contracts in designing suitable systems of corporate governance and contrast the dominant international corporate governance systems in the world today.
A range of issues will be discussed. Are top managers paid unreasonable amounts Do they take excessive risks with corporate assets should they take any risks at all Can the financial and ownership structure of a company be used to limit or influence the incentives that top managers have to protect themselves at the expense of other groups such as employees,shareholders and bondholders such as banks How can we reliably assess the performance of the CEO if the information we need to do the assessment, is known only to the CEO Can we design the explicit contracts of employees managers shareholders and bondholders to reduce such tensions Can implicit contracts achieve similar effects Do mergers create any real improvements or are they merely manifestations of empire-building by top managers How agency costs and asymmetric information are linked How does it hurt shareholders What is the role of the Corporate Board These are examples of the type of questions raised by the module and, though there can be no definite answers to these questions the perspectives that have proven useful in seeking solutions are discussed. The standard topics such as valuation, capital structure and dividend policy will be discussed. Special topics such as corporate governance, mergers and executive compensation will be introduced. The unifying theme of the module role of contracts, be they explicit or implicit, in organizing the financial activities of corporations in the conext of agency costs and asymmetric information.
MODULE AIM
The aim of this module is two-fold. First, to provide a reasonably thorough introduction to a range of the many critical financial decisions facing a corporation. Second, and more specifically, to examine the effect, of the concepts of agency and information asymmetry, on these decisions. The purpose of the module is to create the awareness that, an appreciation of the role of these two concepts, is useful and often essential, if you need to participate in the making of various decisions of a company and in particular of financial decisions.
MODULE OUTCOMES
The outcomes of the module are: First, you will be able to describe and identify a number of instances of financial decision making where the incentive of managers is to increase their own welfare at the expense of other stakeholders in a corporation. Second, you will be able to discuss how financial and ownership structure can mitigate and control such incentives. Third, you will be able describe the concept of information asymmetry in relation to financial decisions. Fourth, you will be able to describe the different transactions in the market for corporate control and discuss the role of corporate financial choices in this context. Fifth, you will be able to critically comment on the role of contracts in designing suitable systems of corporate governance and contrast the dominant international corporate governance systems in the world today.