

## GV212-5-AU International Organizations 2018–2019

### Lecturer and Module Supervisor

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**Module Administrator**

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Module available for Study Abroad students: Yes  No

**ASSESSMENT:** This module is assessed by 100% coursework

### **INSTANT DEADLINE CHECKER**

Assignment Title	Due Date	Coursework Weighting*	Feedback Due
Participation	All sessions	5%	Week 17
Group presentation (IOs)	Weeks 4 to 10, as assigned	20%	On day of presentation
Reaction paper	The <u>day before</u> the class session that will discuss those readings	25%	Week 14
Research design	Week 16	50%	Week 17

**Note:** Research design due in Week 16, day of the session, before 9.45 am.

### **ASSESSMENT**

This module is assessed by 100% coursework. Coursework includes participation in class discussions (5%), a class presentation (20%), a reaction paper (25%), and one research paper (55%).

- **Participation (5%):** Students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the readings, and to make meaningful contributions. If class participation is not satisfactory, unannounced reading quizzes will be implemented. The participation grade will then represent the average grade in these quizzes. If a student misses three or more sessions, the participation mark will be 0. There will not be exceptions to this rule.
- **Group Presentation (20%):** Presentation topics will be assigned to groups of students by week 3. Each group will make a presentation about an IO or international regime. Students should distribute a short paper (5-7 pages) to the whole class and the instructor at least 24 hours before the session of the presentation **both through FASER and as a**

**post in Moodle.** Failure to distribute the paper before the deadline will result in a 35% drop of the assignment's grade. The rest of the class is required to read the paper associated with the presentation before class.

The paper and the oral presentation should contain (1) a summary of the background, goals, and main characteristics of the IO (the students are responsible to find sources for this section, the instructor available to answer questions on this matter), and (2), a discussion of the readings recommended for each topic. This discussion should NOT be a mere summary of the readings, but a presentation of what questions are addressed in the readings, how the articles relate to each other and with the class materials, and what questions remain open. The group is responsible for preparing a 25-minute class presentation based on the short paper, and three questions to discuss with the class. In the remaining 15 minutes of the presentation, the group will organize the discussion around one or more of these questions. The purpose of this last part of the presentation is to make clear connections between the materials already covered in class, with particular dynamics of the IO under study.

- **Reaction paper (25%):** Each student can select one class to write a reaction paper. The topic choice should be notified to the instructor on Week 3. Students who did not choose a session will be assigned a topic. The reaction paper should have the following characteristics (documents that do not follow the formatting rules, or turned after the deadline<sup>1</sup> will not be read, and will receive a 0 as mark):
  - **Format:** 4-6 pages, 1-inch margin, Times News Roman 12, double spaced.
  - **Send to the instructor** the day before the lecture on the topic.
  - **Content:** Papers should reflect the critical reading of the required readings for the class plus one of the recommended readings (indicated as \*\*\*). The purpose of this exercise is NOT to merely summarize the readings. Students are expected to analyze the readings in a comprehensive manner, stressing (1) how they relate to each other, (2) their strengths and weaknesses (i.e., their contribution to the literature analyzed in class, eventual contradictions or lacunas that the student identifies), and (3) propose research questions that may guide further research. The following questions may help to structure the document (but students are NOT required to answer all these questions):
    1. What is the **research question(s)** underlying these articles? Why is it important or interesting? How does it relate to the general literature on IOs?
    2. What are the authors' answers (**theory**)? Critically assess the theoretical arguments (assumptions, theoretical contribution, weaknesses).
    3. **Research design:** how do the authors test their theories? Could you propose an alternative or additional test for these theories?
    4. Is the **evidence** sufficient to answer the research question?
    5. What is your general impression about these articles? What research questions remain open? How would you address them?
- **Research design (50%):** A research paper (without empirical test) is required for the course. Students should discuss the topic/question with the instructor before Week 10. The paper should have the following characteristics. (documents that do not follow the

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<sup>1</sup> Follow the University procedures for late assignments. If necessary, submit a Late Submission of Coursework form to [govquery@essex.ac.uk](mailto:govquery@essex.ac.uk).

formatting rules, or turned after the deadline will not be read, and will receive a 0 as mark):

- **Format:** 15-20 pages (excluding references and figures or tables), 1-inch margin, Times News Roman 12, double spaced. Documents with less than 15 pages will lose 5% of the grade. I will not read beyond page 20.
- **Send to the instructor through FASER** before 9.45 am the day of session, in Week 16.
- **Content:** The paper should address a question related to the course, as discussed with the instructor. The basic structure of the paper is the following:
  1. **Introduction:** Stating the **research question** and its importance
  2. **Literature review** showing what we know about the topic, and showing that the research question is still unanswered, or that there are contradictions in the literature.
  3. **Theory:** your answer to the research question, including a **hypothesis** and an **alternative explanation**.
  4. **Empirical strategy:** How would you test your theory? What data would you use? (Indicate real available data, or how the data could be collected.) How would the test you propose allow you to discard alternative explanations? Students are NOT expected to conduct any statistical work, but can show graphs with descriptive data showing the plausibility of their hypotheses.

**Note regarding proper citation of academic work, for all assignments:** All written work submitted for this class is required to properly cite the referenced materials (both in text, and as a separate bibliography list). Verbatim citation should be limited to key concepts or ideas. For in-text citations, use "(author year: page)" – for example (Chayes and Chayes 1993:178). For the bibliography, follow the template used in this syllabus. If you have doubts, ask your Instructor and/or the Department's Study Skills Officer. If necessary, consult the essay-writing program provided by the University of Essex: <http://www2.essex.ac.uk/essay-writing/>.

## TOP READS

Simmons, Beth A., and Lisa L. Martin. 2002 "International Organizations and Institutions." In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53 (04):699-732.

Stein, Arthur A. 1982. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World " *International Organization* 36 (2, International Regimes):299-324.

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1):3-32.

Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. "Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory." In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G.

Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3):427-60.

Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization*. 47: 175-205.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3):379-406.

Drezner, Daniel W. 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?" *International Organization* 54 (1):73-102.

Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3):564-76.

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization*. 55 (4): 761-799.

Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence." *International Organization* 61 (4):703-33.

Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization* 56 (3):515-49.

Gray, Julia. 2009. "International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4):931-49.

All readings are available on-line or in the library. All the required (essential) readings can be found [here https://rl.talis.com/3/essex/lists/F9ED9DCD-239E-1728-4579-48CD42E2297B.html?lang=en-US&login=1](https://rl.talis.com/3/essex/lists/F9ED9DCD-239E-1728-4579-48CD42E2297B.html?lang=en-US&login=1).

## MODULE DESCRIPTION

This course offers a comprehensive overview of the role of international institutions in promoting international cooperation. The course assumes and builds upon students' prior understanding of theories of international relations and of international politics.

The module is designed around the following question: *Do international institutions promote international cooperation?* In particular, the course analyzes the main challenges to international cooperation, and how international organizations (IOs) can help to overcome them. To answer this question, the module relies on three pillars: First, it introduces a set of theories to help understanding cooperation among states. Second, it applies these theories to the analysis of some of the most important IOs. Finally, the last part of the module reviews the effects of IOs both on the behavior of states, and on international markets.

By the end of the module, the students should be able to: (i) understand and identify the central problems for cooperation in an anarchic world; (ii) identify and explain key concepts

for the analysis of international institutions; (iii) use theories to analyze the role of international institutions in world politics; (iv) demonstrate analytical and critical thinking skills when analyzing political phenomena.

## **MODULE STRUCTURE AND TEACHING**

The module will run over 10 weeks. There will be a two-hour class each week. In weeks 4 to 11, there will be a 60-minute lecture, followed by a 40-minute student presentation and in-class activities.

Attendance and active class participation are required. Because in-class work is important to understand and apply the assigned materials, missing more than two classes will negatively affect the final grade. It is expected that students have read the required readings for a specific week and are prepared to discuss them.

### **How to succeed in this course**

This course has two components: readings and lectures.

- *Readings*: The syllabus lists required and recommended (indicated as \*\*\*). You need to read all required materials before class. It is recommended that you read the articles in the order that are listed. Be aware that for many articles only a set of pages are required for the class. Students do not need to focus on technical or statistical discussions. Students are required to bring the readings to class to facilitate the discussions.
- *Lectures* are designed to help students to understand the basic concepts, provide examples, and link different topics to enhance their understanding of international politics. Lectures do not *just* summarize the reading materials: taking notes is useful. Lectures do not substitute for the reading materials.

### **What we expect of you during lecture and classes:**

- To attend all lectures and classes after having done the required reading.
- To pay attention and take notes as necessary.
- To think about the readings and lectures notes before the class, and be ready to discuss them: try to identify the key assumptions in the texts; map the structure of the argument; underline the conclusions. Highlight to yourself points you don't understand. (If you don't understand it, there's great likelihood others have not understood it either, so don't be shy to ask.) Ask yourself whether you agree with the text, whether you can identify weaknesses or gaps in the argument, and what could someone who disagrees with it argue against it.
- To offer your participation as required (answering questions, asking questions etc.). Learning about and discussing these texts is a communal endeavour and it is a matter of good citizenship to contribute. Further, part of what we want you to achieve, and what we mark you for, is clear and confident oral presentation. You are expected to answer questions, raise new points, and contribute to the progression of discussion in class.

### **How to submit your essay using FASER**

You will be able to access the online submission system via your myEssex portal or via <https://FASER.essex.ac.uk>. FASER allows you to store your work-in-progress.

This facility provides you with an ideal place to keep partially completed copies of your work and ensures that no work, even drafts, is lost. If you have problems uploading your coursework, you should contact [ltt@essex.ac.uk](mailto:ltt@essex.ac.uk). You may find it helpful to look at the FASER guide <http://www.essex.ac.uk/it/elearning/faser/default.aspx>. If you have any questions about FASER, please contact your administrator or refer to the handbook.

**Under NO circumstances is your coursework to be emailed to the administrators or the lecturer. This will NOT be counted as a submission.**

### **Coursework deadline policy for undergraduates**

There is a single policy at the University of Essex for the late submission of coursework in undergraduate courses. Essays must be uploaded before 09.45 on the day of the deadline.

All coursework submitted after the deadline will receive a mark of zero. The mark of zero shall stand unless the student submits satisfactory evidence of extenuating circumstances that indicate that the student was unable to submit the work prior to the deadline. For further information on late submission of coursework and extenuating circumstances procedures please refer to <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/ext-circ.aspx>.

Essay feedback will be given via FASER.

**ALL submissions should be provided with a coversheet (Available from Moodle).**

### **Plagiarism**

Plagiarism is a very serious academic offence and whether done wittingly or unwittingly it is your responsibility. **Ignorance is no excuse!** The result of plagiarism could mean receiving a mark of zero for the piece of coursework. In some cases, the rules of assessment are such that a mark of zero for a single piece of coursework could mean that you will fail your degree. If it is a very serious case, you could be required to withdraw from the University. It is important that you understand right from the start of your studies what good academic practice is and adhere to it throughout your studies.

The Department will randomly select coursework for plagiarism checks and lecturers are very good at spotting work that is not your own. **Plagiarism gets you nowhere; DON'T DO IT!**

Following the guidance on referencing correctly will help you avoid plagiarism.

Please familiarise yourself with the University's policy on academic offences: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/about/governance/policies/academic-offences.aspx>.

### **Extenuating circumstances for late submission of coursework**

The university has guidelines on what is acceptable as extenuating circumstances for later submission of coursework. If you need to make a claim, you should upload

your coursework to FASER and submit a late submission of coursework form which can be found here: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/late-submission.aspx>. This must be done within seven days of the deadline. FASER closes for all deadlines after seven days. The Late Submissions committee will decide whether your work should be marked and you will be notified of the outcome.

If you experience significant longer-term extenuating circumstances that prevent you from submitting your work either by the deadline or within seven days of the deadline, you should submit an Extenuating Circumstances Form for the Board of Examiners to consider at the end of the year <http://www.essex.ac.uk/students/exams-and-coursework/ext-circ.aspx>.

## READINGS

### Class 1. Introduction. Power and institutions

Required:

- Amerasinghe, Chittharanjan F. 2005 *Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2nd edition. **Read pages 1-13.**
- Simmons, Beth A., and Lisa L. Martin. 2002 "International Organizations and Institutions." In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. **Read pages 192-198.**
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3):5-49. **Read pages 8-26, conclusions.**
- Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20 (1):39-51. **Read pages 39-46.**
- Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *International Organization* 53 (04):699-732. **Read pages 699-715.**

Recommended:

\*\*\* Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. 1998. "International Organization and the Study of World Politics." *International Organization* 50(4): 645-685.

\*\*\* Kratochwil, Friederich and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. "International Organization: A State of the Art on an art of the State." *International Organization* 40(4): 753-775.

\*\*\* Martin, Lisa, and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52(4): 729-757.

\*\*\* Thompson, Alexander and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "International Organization." *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics* 5: 692-722.

### Class 2. Cooperation in an anarchic world

Required:

- Stein, Arthur A. 1982. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World " *International Organization* 36 (2, International Regimes):299-324. **Read pages 299-318.**
- Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38 (1):1-24. **Read pages 1-17.**
- Martin, Lisa L. 1992. "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism." *International Organization* 46 (4):765-79. Read pages **768-783 (identify the types of problems).**

Recommended:

\*\*\* Axelrod, Robert, and Robert Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38(1): 226-54.

\*\*\* Axelrod, Robert. 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists." *American Political Science Review* 75: 306-18.

\*\*\* Keohane, Robert. 1986. "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* 40(1): 1-27.

\*\*\* Lake, David A. 2007. "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics." *International Security* 32(1): 47-79.

\*\*\* Olson, Mancur. 1965. "A Theory of Groups and Organizations." In *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press, 5-52.

### **Class 3. Mechanisms that facilitate cooperation (I): Legalization** **PRESENTATION I. Peace and security: UN**

Required:

- Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54 (3):401-19. **Read pages 401-408, plus the indicators of obligation, precision, and delegation.**
- Kahler, Miles. 2000. "The Causes and Consequences of Legalization." *International Organization* 54 (3, Legalization and World Politics):661-83. **Read pages 661-662, 670-673.**
- Lipson, Charles. 1991. "Why are Some International Agreements Informal?" *International Organization* 45 (4):495-538. **Read pages 500-501, 508-538, skim examples.**
- Finnemore, Martha, and Stephen J. Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics." *International Organization* 55: 743-58.. **Read pages 743-751, and conclusion.**
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. "Response to Finnemore and Toope." *International Organization* 55: 759-60.

Recommended:

\*\*\* Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance." *International Organization* 54: 421-56.

\*\*\* Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa L. Martin. 2000. "Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note." *International Organization* 54(3): 603-632.



\*\*\* Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., David G. Victor, and Yonatan Lupu. 2012. "Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field." *American Journal of International Law* 106(1): 47-97.

\*\*\* Haftel, Yoram Z. 2010. "Ratification Counts: US Investment Treaties and FDI Flows into Developing Countries." *Review of International Political Economy* 17 (2):348-77. Read pages **348-354, conclusions**.

\*\*\* Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94: 819-35.

\*\*\* Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs." *International Organization* 54: 573-602.

#### **Class 4. Mechanisms that facilitate cooperation (II). Delegation** **PRESENTATION II. Peace and security: NATO**

Required:

- Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1):3-32. **Read pages 3-5, 9-12, & 16-17.**
- Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2006. "Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory." In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. **Read pages 3-23**
- Hawkins, Darren. 2004. "Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (4):779-804. **Read pages 779-787.**
- Johnson, Tana, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. "International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot." *International Organization* 68(1): 177-209. **Read pages 177-198.**

Recommended:

\*\*\* Fearon, James. D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2): 269-305.

\*\*\* Johnson, Tana, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2012. "A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and Separation." *International Organization* 66(4): 645-677.

\*\*\* Keohane, Robert O. 1982. "The Demand for International Regimes." *International Organization* 36(2): 325-355.

\*\*\* Lake, David A. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2006. "The Logic of Delegation to International Organizations." In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds. Cambridge University Press, 341-68.

\*\*\* Schneider, Christina. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 331-355.

## **Class 5. Participation in IOs**

### **PRESENTATION III. Economic and financial cooperation: IMF and WB**

Required:

- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42 (3):427-60. Read pages **427-430, 433-453**.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorf. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56(3): 477-513. Read pages **477-481**.
- Garriga, Ana Carolina. 2009. "Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Soup?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (5):698-726. Read pages **698-707, conclusions**.
- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62 (1):65-101. **Read the argument**.

Recommended:

\*\*\* Chapman, Terrence L, Johannes Urpelainen, and Scott Wolford. 2013. "International Bargaining, Endogenous Domestic Constraints, and Democratic Accountability." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 25: 260-83.

\*\*\* Chapman, Terrence. 2009. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." *International Organization* 63(4): 733-764.

\*\*\* Dluhosch, Barbara, and Nikolai Ziegler. 2011. "The Paradox of Weakness in the Politics of Trade Integration." *Constitutional Political Economy* 22: 325-54.

\*\*\* Gray, Julia, René Lindstädt, and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2017. "The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations." *International Interactions* 43: 619-42.

\*\*\* Kinne, Brandon J. 2013. "Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 107 (04):766-85. Read pages **766-773, conclusions**.

\*\*\* McLean, Elena and Randall Stone. 2011. "The Kyoto Protocol: Two-Level Bargaining and European Integration." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 99-113.

\*\*\* Pelc, Krzysztof. 2011. "Why do Some Countries get better WTO Accession Terms than Others?" *International Organization* 65(4): 639-672.

\*\*\* Stasavage, David. 2004. "Open-Door or Closed Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining." *International Organization* 58(4): 667-703.

## **Class 6. Compliance**

### **PRESENTATION IV. Economic and financial cooperation: GATT and WTO**

Required:

- Simmons, Beth A. (1998) "Compliance with International Agreements." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 1: 75-93. **Read "The meaning of compliance," pages 77-79.**
- Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization*. 47: 175-205. **Read pages 175-187.**

- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3):379-406. **Read pages 379-381, 392-397.**
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-622. **Read pages 611-614, and conclusions.**
- Simmons, Beth and Daniel Hopkins. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 623-631. **Skim technical explanations.**

Recommended:

\*\*\* Carnegie, Allison. 2014. "States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 108(1): 54-70.

\*\*\* Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *International Organization* 59(2): 363-398.

\*\*\* Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2): 269-305.

\*\*\* Gray, Julia. 2014. "Domestic Capacity and the Implementation Gap in Regional Trade Agreements." *Comparative Political Studies* 47: 55-84.

\*\*\* Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference." *Yale Law Journal* 111: 1935-2042.

\*\*\* Kelley, Judith. 2007. "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements." *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 573-589.

\*\*\* Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721-37. **Read pages 721-726, Table 3, conclusions**

\*\*\* Morrow, James. 2007. "When Do States Follow with the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 559-572.

\*\*\* Raustiala, Kal, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2002. "Considering Compliance." In *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. New York and London: Sage Publications.

\*\*\* Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *American Political Science Review* 94 (4):819-35.

\*\*\* Simmons, Beth. 2010. "Treaty Compliance and Violation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13(1): 273-296.

## **Class 7. Enforcement and sanctions**

### **PRESENTATION V. Human rights regimes**

Required:

- Drezner, Daniel W. 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?" *International Organization* 54 (1):73-102. **Read pages 73-78.**

- Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3):564-76. Read pages **564-568 (until "Sanctions and instability...")**.
- McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation through Agent Specific Punishments." *International Organization*. 54(4): 809-824. Read pages **809-812, 821-822**.
- Donno, Daniela. 2010. "Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms." *International Organization* 64: 593-625.. Read pages **593-604, conclusions**.

Recommended:

\*\*\* Gilligan, Michael. 2006. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime." *International Organization* 60(4): 935-967.

\*\*\* Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59(3): 593-629.

\*\*\* Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2008. "Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem." *International Organization* 62(4): 689-716.

\*\*\* Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. "Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 174-195.

\*\*\* Tallberg, Jonas. 2002. "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management and the European Union." *International Organization* 56(3): 609-643.

## **Class 8. Institutional design**

### **PRESENTATION VI. International Criminal Court**

Required:

- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization*. 55 (4): 761-799. **Read pages 761-780, 796-799.**
- Chiba, Daina, Jesse Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2015. "Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Design." *Journal of Politics* 77(4): 968-982.
- Wendt, Alexander. 2001. "Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design." *International Organization* 55(4): 1019-1049. **Read pages 1041-1049.**

Recommended:

\*\*\* Duffield, John S. 2003. "The Limits of Rational Design." *International Organization* 57(2): 411-430.

\*\*\* Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. "Is there a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization* 58(3): 459-484.

\*\*\* Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer, and Christopher Fariss. 2011. "Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogation from Human Rights Treaties." *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.

\*\*\* Gray, Julia. 2018. "Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 62: 1-13.

- \*\*\* Johnson, Tana. 2013. "Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control." *Journal of Politics* 75(1): 183-197.
- \*\*\* Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward." *International Organization* 55(4): 1051-1082.
- \*\*\* Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. "Contracting around International Uncertainty." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 549-565.
- \*\*\* Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.
- \*\*\* Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *International Organization* 48 (3):425-58.
- \*\*\* Morrow, James D. 2001. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties." *International Organization* 55 (4):971-91.
- \*\*\* Pelc, Krzysztof. 2009. "Seeking Escape: the Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(2): 349-368.
- \*\*\* Reinhardt, Eric and Jeff Kucik. 2009. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62(3): 477-505.
- \*\*\* Richards, John E. 2001. "Institutions for Flying: How States Built a Market in International Aviation Services." *International Organization* 55 (4):993-1017.
- \*\*\* Rosendorff ,B. Peter. 2005 "Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 389-400.
- \*\*\* Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829-857.
- \*\*\* Schneider, Christina. 2011. "Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations." *International Studies Quarterly* 55(2): 331-355.
- \*\*\* Slapin, Jonathan B., and Julia Gray. 2014. "Depth, Ambition and Width in Regional Economic Organizations." *Journal of European Public Policy* 21: 730-45.
- \*\*\* Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, Theresa Squatrito, and Christer Jonsson. 2014. "Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations." *International Organization* 68(4): 741-744.

## **Class 9. Effects of IO on states: Socialization and diffusion**

### **PRESENTATION VII. Environmental cooperation**

Required:

- Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence." *International Organization* 61 (4):703-33. **Read pages 703-710, 721-731.**
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. "Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization." *International Organization* 56 (3):515-49. **Read pages 515-531, & 542-543.**

- Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2011. "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures." *International Organization* 65 (01):103-37. **Read pages 103-117.**

Recommended:

\*\*\* Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" *World Politics* 57(1): 1-38. **Read Introduction and pages 7-30.**

\*\*\* Cao, Xun. 2009. "Networks of Intergovernmental Organizations and Convergence in Domestic Economic Policies." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (4):1095-130. Read pages **1095-1105, 117-1123.**

\*\*\* Dorussen, Han, and Hugh Ward. 2008. "Intergovernmental Organizations and the Kantian Peace: A Network Perspective." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2008 52(2): 189-212.

\*\*\* Finnemore, Martha. 1993. "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy." *International Organization* 47(4): 565-597.

\*\*\* Hooghe, Liesbeth. 2005. "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission." *International Organization* 59(4): 861-898.

\*\*\* Hyde, Susan. 2007. "The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *World Politics* 60(1): 37-63.

\*\*\* Johnston, Alastair. 2001. "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments." *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 487-516.

\*\*\* Kelley, Judith. 2004. "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions." *International Organization*, 58(3): 425-457.

\*\*\* Lebovic, James M., and Erik Voeten. 2008. "The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4): 861-888.

\*\*\* Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. "Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 269-294.

\*\*\* Mansfield, Edward, and Jon Pevehouse. 2006. "Democratization and International Organizations." *International Organization* 60(1): 137-167.

\*\*\* Pevehouse, Jon C. 2002. "With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3):611-26. Read pages **611-617, & 623.**

\*\*\* Poast, Paul, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2015. "How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation?" *World Politics* 67 (01):72-113. Read pages **72-88.**

\*\*\* Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171-189.

## **Class 10. Effects of IO on markets**

Required:

- Gray, Julia. 2009. "International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4):931-49. **Read pages 931-936.**
- Garriga, Ana Carolina. 2016. "Human Rights Regimes, Reputation, and Foreign Direct Investment." *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(1):160-172.
- Nielsen, Richard A., and Beth A. Simmons. 2015. "Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?". *International Studies Quarterly* 59: 197-208.

Recommended:

\*\*\* Carter, David B, Rachel Wellhausen, and Paul K Huth. 2018. "International Law, Territorial Disputes and Foreign Direct Investment." *International Studies Quarterly*. Online First.

\*\*\* Chapman, Terrence, Songying Fang, Xin Li, and Randall W. Stone. 2017. "Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets." *British Journal of Political Science* 47: 329-49.

\*\*\* Kerner, Andrew. 2009 "Why Should I Believe You: The Sources of Credibility in Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Effects" *International Studies Quarterly*. 53(1):73- 102.

\*\*\* Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables." *International Organization* 36 (2, International Regimes):497-510. Read pages **501-510**.

\*\*\* Mosley, Layna. 2003. "Attempting Global Standards: National Governments, International Finance, and the IMF's Data Regime." *Review of International Political Economy* 10: 331-62.

\*\*\* Mosley, Layna. 2010. "Regulating Globally, Implementing Locally: The Financial Codes and Standards Effort." *Review of International Political Economy* 17: 724-61.

\*\*\* Wilf, Meredith. 2016. "Credibility and Distributional Effects of International Banking Regulations: Evidence From US Bank Stock Market Returns." *International Organization* 70(4): 763-796.

## Readings for group presentations

### I. Peace and security: UN

- Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59 (3):527-57. **Read pages 529-551.**
- Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *The American Political Science Review* 95 (4):845-58. **Read pages 845-851** (no "abstention"); **855-6.**
- Thompson, Alexander. 2006. "Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60 (01):1-34. **Read pages 1-4.**
- Beardsley, Kyle, and Holger Schmidt. 2012. "Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945–20021." *International Studies Quarterly* 56: 33-49. **Read the argument.**

### II. Peace and security: NATO

- Chapman, Terrence L. 2007. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(1): 134-166.
- Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War." *International Organization* 54 (04):705-35. **Read pages 705-716, 723 (analysis)-735.**
- Hemmer, Christopher, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2002. "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." *International Organization* 56 (03):575-607 **Read pages 575-592.**
- And one of the following:

\*\*\* Kydd, Andrew. 2001. "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement." *International Organization* 55(4): 801-828.

\*\*\* Fang, Songying, Jesse Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2014. "To Concede or To Resist? The Restraining Effects of Military Alliances." *International Organization* 68(4): 775-809.

\*\*\* Huth, Paul, Sarah Croco, and Ben Appel. 2011. "Law and the Use of Force in World Politics: The Varied Effects of Law on the Exercise of Military Force in Territorial Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 17-31.

### III. Economic and financial cooperation: IMF and WB

- Nielson, Dan, and Michael Tierney. 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Reform." *International Organization* 57(2): 241-276.
- Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.
- And two of the following:



\*\*\* Vreeland, James (2008). *The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending*. New York: Routledge. Read pages **50-67, 95-96, & 106-111**.

\*\*\* Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (1):120-48. Read pages **120-126, & 140-1**

\*\*\* Nielson, Daniel L., and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform." *International Organization* 57 (2):241-76. Read pages **253-266**.

#### **IV. Economic and financial cooperation: GATT and WTO**

- Rose, Andrew K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" *The American Economic Review* 94 (1):98-114. Read pages **98-99, 102-103 (Benchmark results), & 111-112**.
- Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61 (1):37-67. Read pages **37-47 & 52-64**.
- Davis, Christina L. and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. "Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication." *Journal of Politics* 71 (July): 1033-49.
- And one of the following:

\*\*\* Wolfe, Robert. 2004. "Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Where the WTO Is Going after Seattle, Doha and Cancun." *Review of International Political Economy* 11 (3):574-96.

\*\*\* Deardorff, Alan V., and Robert M. Stern. 2002. "What You Should Know about Globalization and the World Trade Organization." *Review of International Economics* 10 (3):404-23.

\*\*\* Kim, Moonhawk. 2008. "Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures." *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (September): 657-86.

#### **V. Human rights regimes**

- Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. "Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (4):588-621. Read pages **588-598, & 612-613**.
- Neumayer, Eric. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (6):925-53. Read pages **925-933, & 950-951**.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2007. "Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most." *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (4):407-25. Read pages **407-411, 413-415, & 422-423**.
- Lebovic, James H., and Erik Voeten. 2006. "The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators." *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (4):861-88.

## VI. International Criminal Court

- Simmons, Beth and Allison Danner. 2010. "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court." *International Organization* 64(2): 225-226.
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2006. "Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime." *International Organization* 60(4): 935-967.
- Chapman, Terrence L., and Stephen Chaudoin. 2013. "Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court." *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 400-09.

## VII. Environmental cooperation

- Thompson, Alexander. 2010. "Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime." *European Journal of International Relations* 16 (2):269-96. Read pages **276-288**.
- Böhmelt, Tobias, and Ulrich H. Pilster. 2010. "International Environmental Regimes: Legalisation, Flexibility and Effectiveness." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 45: 245-60.
- von Stein, Jana. 2008. "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2):243-68.
- Urpelainen, Johannes. 2013. "A Model of Dynamic Climate Governance: Dream Big, Win Small." *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 13 (2):107-25.